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Conserving a Legal Heritage in Hong
Kong: Environmental Regulation After
1997
BRYAN BACHNER*

I. INTRODUCrION

Environmental deterioration threatens to undermine Hong
Kong's economic prosperity.1 The lack of a sound regulatory system to control the emission of air pollutants, the discharge of water pollutants, and the disposal of waste will slow economic growth
in Hong Kong. 2 The present environmental regulatory framework, which was established under British rule, is developing into
a promising pollution control regime for Hong Kong.3 In light of
the People's Republic of China's (PRC) nascent environmental record, 4 howeyer, the restoration of mainland authority over Hong
Kong in 1997 rasies serious questions for the territory's future environmental policy.
* Associate Professor of Law, City University of Hong Kong; Chairperson, Hong
Kong Environmental Law Association. This Article benefitted from its presentation at
Peking University at a conference entitled "Comparative Studies Relating to the Legal
Systems of the Mainland and Hong Kong in September of 1996." I would like to express
my appreciation to the City University of Hong Kong for its financial support of this research under the Strategic Grant Scheme. I would also like to thak my student assistant
Man Sui Lun for his help in identifying relevant source materials.
1. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DEP'T OF H.K., HONG KONG-THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DEPARTMENT 19861996, at 54-56 (1996).
2. See Hung Wint-tat, The Environment,in THE OTHER HONG KONG REPORT 1995,
at 343 (Stephen Y.L. Cheung & Stephen M.H. Sze eds., 1995); see also Man Si-wai, The
Environment, in FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD 319,
319-23 (Joseph Y.S. Cheng & Sonny S.H. Lo eds., 1995).
3. See HONG KONG GOV'T, HONG KONG 1996, at 367 (1996).

4. See generally VACLAV SMIL, CHINA'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1993).
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Protecting Hong Kong's environment in the short or long
term is a complex problem. Although policy makers and academics claim that Hong Kong has adopted a "laissez-faire" approach
to governance, 5 government intervention through environmental
laws and regulation is quite extensive. In contrast, the PRC is currently in the midst of considerable market and legal reforms that
have led to the decentralization of its highly planned economy and
a substantial reduction in governmental involvement in the operation of business.
An understanding of the interaction-or perhaps, better said,
confrontation-between these two ideological trajectories is essential to coming to terms with the problem of pollution control
regulation in Hong Kong after 1997. This Article evaluates how
the transition to Chinese authority may impact the effectiveness of
pollution control laws in Hong Kong, using a "law and economics"
approach to study the problem. 6 Part II analyzes Hong Kong's
environmental regulatory framework under the United Kingdom
by evaluating the extent to which the government intervenes in
economic activities in order to control pollution. Part III examines
mainland PRC's legal reform by exploring the extent to which the
government is being removed from economic decision-making.
After discussing the impact of the transition from British to Chinese authority -on the implementation of Hong Kong's environS. For a historical summation of the Hong Kong government's laissez-faire policy,
see David Campbell, Economic Ideology and Hong Kong's Governance Structure.After
1997, in HONG KONG, CHINA AND 1997: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 88, 89-90
(Raymond Wacks ed., 1993). A speech by former Secretary for the Treasury Donald
Tsang illustrates the disposition of the present key economic decision-makers toward.
public spending. Tsang stated:
Whatever happens, we must not as a community slip into the bad ways of
some of the developed countries, whose citizens look to the government to solve
every problem....
Ultimately such a situation reduces the standard of living of all citizens,
even those who thought they were being helped by the policies that eventually
bankrupted the government.
Stacy Mosher, Tsang's Howler over 'Silence of the Lambs' Speech, E. EXPRESS, May 1415,1994.
6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 21-26 (4th ed. 1992).
Law and economics is a normative approach to legal study. It examines legal subjects
that do not directly regulate economic markets, such as pollution control, through the
application of economic principles.
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mental policy after 1997, Part IV concludes that to achieve sustainable development, post-1997 environmental policy in Hong
Kong must take into account all aspects of Hong Kong's unique
background and status.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN HONG KONG
A. Legal History
Hong Ko ng's environmental legal history can be divided into
three phases. The first phase spanned from the 1840s until the
1930s. The second phase started in the late 1930s and ended in the
early 1970s. The third phase began in the late 1970s and continues
through today.
1. The First Phase
In the first phase, Hong Kong's government demonstrated
marginal interest in establishing a system to protect Hong Kong's
natural resources. At the outset of British rule, the most significant factor affecting environmental affairs was the decision that
the Crown Authority would retain freehold rights over most existing and reclaimed land. 7 The government also enacted piecemeal
legislation regarding land use and hygiene. In May 1841, for example, a Public Notice and Declaration stated that guidelines for
land distribution would be set according to the "pleasure of the
Queen." 8 As a result of the poor planning, sanitation and overcrowding were major problems during the early years of Hong
Kong's existence.
In response to these problems, the government enacted two
Good and Cleanliness Ordinances in 1844 and 1845. 9 A series of
Building Ordinances to regulate construction followed from 1887
to 1889.10 In addition, the government enacted the Closed House

7. Se'e SIN KIM FAN, BUILDING PROJECT FINANCE IN HONG KONG: LAW AND
PRACTICE 7 (1987). Except for St. John's Cathedral and the University of Hong Kong,
which has been provided a 999-year lease, the Crown Authority holds all land under
leaseholds. See id.
8. See ROGER BRISTOW, LAND-USE PLANNING IN HONG KONG: HISTORY,
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 23 (1987).
9. See i at 28.
10. See id. at 39.
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and Insanitary Dwellings Ordinance in 1894 and the Public Health
and Buildings Ordinance in 1903.11 Finally, in 1922, a Town Planning Scheme provided guidelines for Hong Kong's land development. 12 It remained in effect until World War 11.13
The government and the local population resisted the enactment of welfare legislation related to hygiene problems arising
from contagious disease or lack of adequate housing. One jaundiced evaluation of the situation stated:
[I]t seems improbable that any authority charged with the responsibility for sanitary affairs in Hong Kong, however constituted, would have escaped a rough passage, for its task inevitably involved intrusion in a dozen different shapes into private
persons' most intimate affairs, and that meant not merely challenging an Englishman in his castle, but also traversing the ageold belief of the Chinese that once their taxes were paid they
were guaranteed against further interference and were free to
live or die, avoid, catch and spread disease as it pleased them. 14
This analysis reveals an implicitly problematic issue in environmental regulations: the tension between an individual's right to
privacy and the State's duty to protect the public welfare.
2. The Second Phase
An ineffectual effort to constitute a comprehensive land use
control system characterized the second phase of Hong Kong's
environmental legal history. In 1939, new planning legislation
stipulated inadequate enforcement powers to prosecute noncompliance. Unlike the Building Authority, which could reject
building plans that did not meet statutory guidelines, the Planning
Authority had no control over developments related to important
issues, such as a change of land use. 15 Despite extraordinary
commercial growth and land development, the planning legislation
11. See id.at 42.
12. See id. at 50.
13. See iaL
14. GEOFFREY ROBLEY SAYER, HONG KONG 1862-1919: YEARS OF DISCRETION 57

(1975).
15. See Myrette Fok, Controlling the Development of Land in Hong Kong Through
Crown Lease Conditions: "Some Aspects of the Hong Kong Experience, Address at the
International Conference for Comparative Law Between Hong Kong and the PRC 9
(Sept. 2-3, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
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was not amended until 1991.
Because effective planning legislation did not exist, the government relied on the enforcement of the original lease conditions
to assure appropriate land use. An example of such a condition
was the offensive trade clause. The purpose of the offensive trade
clause was to minimize the harm caused by unfettered and dangerous economic activity. It stated:
The.lessee his Executors, Administrators, or Assignees, or any
other person or person, shall not nor will, during his continuance of this demise sue, exercise, or follow, in or upon the said
premises or any part thereof, the trade or business of a Brazier,
Slaughterman, Soap-maker, Sugar-baker, Fellmonger, Melter
of tallow, Oilman, Butcher, Distiller, Victualler, or Tavernkeeper, Blacksmith, Nightman, Scavenger, or any other noisy,
noisome or offensive trade or business whatever without the li16
cense of his said Majesty.
The government's willingness to enforce such lease conditions
and other planning regulations, however, was half-hearted. For instance, in the early 1950s, the Director of Public Works reported
that due to other financial commitments, town planning laws and
policies would not be enforced and town planning staff would be
limited to preparing urgently required draft legislation. 17 Furthermore, in 1983, in Attorney General v. Melhado Investment
Ltd.,18 Hong Kong courts allowed a developer to use a plot of
land, which was originally intended for agricultural purposes, to
store environmentally dangerous containers. 19
3. The Third Phase
The third phase of Hong Kong's environmental legal history
can be described as a substantial corrective reaction to its dismal
environmental record. The government adopted a highly regulated approach to pollution control and land use for three basic
reasons. 20 First, although Hong Kong's passive non-interventionist
16. Id. at 3.
17. See BRISTOW, supra note 8, at 72.
18. [1993] H.K.L.R. 327 (Ct. App.).
19. See id at 327-30.
20. Following Meihado, the government amended the law to establish its authority to
effectively enforce the planning laws. In 1991, amendments were enacted to extend statu-
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approach to regulation contributed to Hong Kong's economic
prosperity, it was also arguably responsible for Hong Kong's present environmental decline. 21 In order to remedy the severe environmental decline and to reverse a historically unsympathetic corporate ethic, government intervention was necessary. 22 Second,
the environmental deterioration led to a dramatic decline in the
quality of life in Hong Kong. For example, air pollution led to a
dramatic increase in respiratory ailments, 23 water pollution contaminated Hong Kong's marine population, 24 and the lack of adequate noise control caused territory-wide nuisances. 25 This environmental decline precipitated public demands through street and
media protests, the formation of green activist groups, and legal
action to force the government to prevent further decline. 26 Third,

Hong Kong's substandard environmental reputation was discouraging tourism, Hong Kong's largest source of foreign income. 27

tory planning jurisdiction into the non-urban area and enforcement power against unauthorized development in development permission areas. In the same year, other amendments established an independent Appeal Board to replace the Governor-in-Council. In
1996, a new Town Planning Bill was proposed to overhaul the land use system. This new
bill intends to address environmentally sensitive development proposals by designating
them as "designated developments," "environmentally sensitive areas," "special design
areas," or "comprehensive development areas." See CONSULTATION PAPER ON TOWN
PLANNING BILL 11-12 (1996). Such designations would require special permission for
development. See id.
21. See Stuart Reed, Managing Hong Kong's High Pressure Environment, 2 ENVTL
POL'Y & PRAC. 51, 52 (1992).
22. See Peter Hills & William Barron, Hong Kong: Can the Dragon Clean Its Nest?,
ENVIRONMENT, Oct. 1990, at 17,18.
23. See Cliff Buddle, Air Pollution Level Close to Official .DangerLevel, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 21, 1996 at 6; Fiona Holland, No Warning on Smog Danger,-S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 22, 1996, at 3; Fiona Holland, Air Pollution Level Reaches
PerilousHigh: Public Warned of Worse to Come from China as Asthma Victims Suffer, E.
EXPRESS, May 11-12,1995.
24. See Ng Kang-Chung, Coastal Pollution Plagues Villages, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 8, 1996 at 6; Patricia Young, Survival Fearsfor Rare Pink Dolphins, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 7, 1995, at 2.
25. See Keith Wallis, Noise Dispute Exposes Loophole, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 7, 1996, at 4; Fiona Holland & Alex Lo, Outrage over Noise Exemption, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 23,1996, at 6.
26. See generally Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Environmental Protection in Hong Kong
Amidst Transition: Is Hong Kong Ready to Manage Its Environment by Law?, 19 ENVrL.
MGMT. 331 (1995).
27. See HONG KONG HANSARD: REPORTINGS OF THE SITTINGS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF HONG KONG, 1988/89 Sess., Oct. 12, 1988-July 19, 1989, at 2322-24
(July 19,1989) (speech of Martin Barrow).
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The government has enacted many significant environmental
laws over the past two decades. 28 The government's commitment
to use these anti-pollution laws to achieve satisfactory environmental objectives is reflected in the costly non-compliance penalties. 29 Furthermore, Hong Kong's government has nearly completed replacing its ad-hoc environmental impact assessment.
30
process with a formalized approach.
Hong Kong courts also seem to be incorporating sound environmental principles into their decisions. For instance, in contrast.
to the anti-environmental Melhado decision, 31 the court in Secan
28. See, e.g., Air Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 311 (1987);
Water Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 358 (1980); Noise Control
Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 400 (1988); Waste Disposal Ordinance, LAWS OF
HONG KONG ch. 354 (1987); Ozone Layer Protection Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG
ch. 403 (1989). Additional forms of environmental legislation include: Merchant Shipping (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 413
(1991); Merchant Shipping (Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution) Ordinance,
LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 414 (1991); Dumping at Sea Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG
KONG ch. 466 (1995); Dangerous Goods Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 295
(1956); Waste Disposal (Amendment) Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 354 (1991);
Sewage Services Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 463 (1995); Buildings Ordinance,
LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 123 (1956).
29. Under section 10 of the Air Pollution Control Ordinance, failure to comply with
the air pollution abatement notice may result in a HK$500,000 fine and on6 year imprisonment. See Air Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 311, § 10. Under section 18 of the Waste Disposal Ordinance, unlawful depositing of waste may result
in a HK$500,000 fine and six months imprisonment. See Waste Disposal Ordinance,
LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 354, § 18. For risking public health and safety under section 32
of the Waste Disposal (Chemical Waste) (General) Regulations, the wrongdoer may be
exposed to a HK$200,000 fine and six month imprisonment. See Waste Disposal
(Chemical Waste) (General) Regulations, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 354 sub. leg. C, § 32
(1992). Under section 3 of the Ozone Layer Protection Ordinance, the manufacture of a
prohibited substance may result in a HK$1,000,000 fine and two years imprisonment. See
Ozone Layer Protection Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 403, § 3. Under section
8(1)(a) of the Water Pollution Control Ordinance, a person who discharges any waste or
polluting matter into Hong Kong control zone waters may receive a HK$200,000 fine and
two years imprisonment. See Water Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG
ch. 358, § 8(1)(a). According to section 26 of the proposed Environmental Impact Assessment Bill, environmental permit violations may result in a fine up to HK$5,000,000
and two years imprisonment. See Proposed Environmental Impact Assessment Bill, § 26
30. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text; see also Environmental Protection
and Nature Conservation, H.K. ENVTL. L. ASS'N NEWSL. (Hong Kong Envtl. Law Ass'n,
Wanchai, H.K.), Spring 1996, at 6, 6. For an extensive analysis of the Environmental Impact Assessment Bill, see HONG KONG ENvTL. LAW ASS'N, SUBMISSION ON THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT BILL (1996).
31. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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Ltd. v. Attorney General32 affirmed the Environmental Protection
Department's (EPD) authority to use environmental principles
when making decisions concerning its statutory powers. 33 This
ruling reversed a lower court's decision requiring the EPD to use
business principles when making decisions. 34 In addition, the
Court of Appeal entertained two appeals challenging the enforce35
ment of anti-pollution legislation.
B. EnvironmentalRegulatory Framework
In order to understand the present regulatory framework, an
examination of the underlying structure is necessary. This section
sets out the problems besetting the statutory system and illustrates
how the state is coming to terms with these problems.
1. The Theoretical Problem
Environmental law is designed to perfect the free market
where the market has failed.36 In Hong Kong, the existence of severe pollution problems reveals that the laissez-faire approach has
not adequately dealt with the pollution problem. Because businesses will not voluntarily respond to pollution control, Hong
Kong's government must take measures to clean up the pollution.37 Although Hong Kong has achieved substantial progress in
halting the ecological decline through environmental legislation
over the last decade, the enactment and enforcement of effective
environmental laws has been, and continues to be, a difficult process.

38

32. [1995] 2 H.K.C. 629 (Ct. App.).
33. See id at 629-30.
34. See id.
35. See Friends of the Earth (Charity) Ltd. v. Attorney General, Case No. 92MP0273
(H.K. Sup. Ct. Api. 13, 1992); Asia Dyeing Co. v. The Authority (appointed under the
Air Pollution Control Ordinance, Cap: 311), [19901 1 H.K.L.R. 263 (Ct. App.).
36. But see JO ANN KWONG, MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM:

LESSONS FOR HONG

KONG (1988). For a rebuttal of Kwong's argument, see Bryan Bachner, Sweep Before
Your Own Door: The Legal Concept of Environmentalism in the Pearl River Delta, in
CHINA, HONG KONG AND 1997: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY, supra note 5, at 229, 23038.
37. See GENEVRA RICHARDSON ET AL., POLICING POLLUTION:

A STUDY OF

REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 5-6 (1982).
38. See PLANNING, ENV'T, & LANDS BRANCH, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
HEADING TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY: THE THIRD REVIEW OF PROGRESS ON THE 1989
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Anthony Ogus, who has written the clearest criticisms of
regulatory theory, 39 argues that the gdal of pollution control legislation is to maintain socially efficient pollution levels where the
marginal costs of pollution equal the marginal social benefits of
the activity creating the pollution. 40 For example, the harmful
smoke discharged by an industrial polluter brings both costs and
benefits to the community. The costs include medical costs associated with treating respiratory problems, economic costs caused by
a decline in productivity, and environmental clean-up costs. The
benefits include employment by the industrial polluter, taxes collected from the industry, and economic benefits derived from attracting other trade and commerce to the area. There is a presumption that environmentally reasonable standards should allow
for some pollution. According to that presumption, the government's responsibility is to consider the relative advantages and disadvantages of the pollution-generating activity "and to develop a
legal mechanism to prevent that activity from producing a social
harm greater than the benefit to the community.
The establishment of sensible environmental standards, however, is troublesome. First, calculating the social cost involves assessing indeterminate values associated with health costs, aesthetic
harm, concern for future generations, and the potential impact of
transboundary pollution from southern China. 41 Second, the
problem of transboundary pollution prejudices the formulation of
local environmental quality standards. 42 Third, it is difficult to determine accurate emission levels for one plant when a neighboring
plant pollutes the same air or water. 43 Fourth, because the pollution from older plants caused by the use of outdated technology
will necessarily be more expensive to abate, the calculation of appropriate abatement costs is inequitable if newer and older plants
WHITE PAPER: POLLUTION INHONG KONCr--A TIME TO ACT 37-42 (1996) [hereinafter
THE THIRD REVIEW].
39. See generally ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION:

LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC

THEORY (1994).
40. See id, at 206.
41. See Bryan Bachner, No Law, No Sky: Economic Development and Environment
in the Fifth Dragon, DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN CHINA: A REPORT ON THE PEARL
RIVER DELTA REGION INCLUDING THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 186 (J. Cheng & S.

Macpherson eds., 1995); see also OGUS, supra note 39, at 205.
42. See OGUS, supra note 39, at 205.
43. See id at 204-05.
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are subject to equal compliance requirements. 44 Fifth, the environmental decision-making process, which includes the issuance of
licenses, permits, and abatement notices, is vulnerable to abuse by
the private sector.45 This phenomenon is particularly relevant to
Hong Kong, where the commercial sector has historically dominated the legislature 46 and public scrutiny of environmental decision-making is marginal. 47
2. Environmental Pollution Control Regulation
The Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands (SPEL)
determines environmental policy and law in Hong Kong.48 The
EPD, which is the SPEL's executive arm, advises on policy and enforces the law. 49 The SPEL consults with the Advisory Council of
the Environment, which is composed of a variety of public and
private interest groups, 50 at every step of the environmental decision-making process. 51 The EPD recently decentralized and
opened local control offices that have the authority to grant licenses and to advise local polluters. 52 This institutional infrastructure implements two forms of legal measures to achieve its environmental goals: (1) command and control regulations and (2)
economic instruments.

44. See id.
at 205.
45. See id.
46. See KATHLEEN CHEEK-MILBY, A LEGISLATURE COMES OF AGE:
KONG'S SEARCH FOR INFLUENCE AND IDENTITY 169 (1995).

HONG

47. See Terri Lynne Mottershead, The Control of Water Pollution in Hong Kong under the Water Pollution Control Ordinance 1990-1995, at 98 (1996) (unpublished LL.M.
dissertation, University of Queensland) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and ComparativeLaw Journal).
48. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DEP'T, HONG KONG GOV'T, ENVIRONMENT: HONG KONG 1995: (A REVIEW OF 1994), at 18 (1996) [hereinafter EN-

VIRONMENT HONG KONG 1995].
49. See idat 18, 51.
50. The Advisory Council of the Environment is composed of a variety of constituent
interests, including members of the Legislative Council, the Urban and Regional Councils, District Boards, tertiary educational institutions, green groups, and commercial and
industrial associations. See id.at 117. The Secretary for Planning, Environment and
Lands, the Director of th Environmental Protection Department, the Director of Planning, and the Director of Agriculture and Fisheries are in permanent attendance. See id.
51. See id&
52. See id. at 76.
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a. Command and Control Regulations
The command and control approach to pollution control requires the application of state authority to induce industry to reduce pollution generation. The command and control system of
Hong Kong can be divided into three interrelated elements: socially efficient objectives, target standards, and specification and
performance standards.
i. Socially Efficient Objectives
The first step toward the enactment of an effective environmental law is the establishment of a rational objective. The purpose of environmental law should be to minimize the social costs
of pollution, thereby assuring the productivity of resources that
would otherwise be used to remedy individual or environmental
harm. This welfare argument for allocative efficiency implicitly
adopts the Paretotest. 53 According to this normative test, optimal
resource allocation is achieved when no one can be made better
off without simultaneously making someone else worse off.54
In contrast to contemporary forms of environmental legislation, the earlier Hong Kong statutes did not take into account socially efficient objectives. 55 While the earlier statutes were useful
in beginning to recognize the importance of the State's role in controlling and preventing pollution, the lack of any sensible objectives undermined the law's effectiveness from the start.56 For example, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 1985
principles for practice display only a superficial commitment to
environmental protection. 57 Rather than formulating law and
policy. to comprehensively address pollution, the EPA preferred
flexible administrative responses with no legal obligation to
achieve environmental objectives or enforce environmental laws.
The original objective was merely to persuade polluters to reduce
53. See OGus, supra note 39, at 24.
54. See id
55. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
56. See Summary Offences Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 228 (1933); Public
Health and Municipal Services Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 132 (1960).
57. See B.C. Ashcroft, EnvironmentalPlanningin Hong Kong, in POLLUTION IN THE
URBAN ENVIRONMENT 1, 4 (M.W.H. Chan et al., Hong Kong Envtl. Protection Agency,
eds., 1985).
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pollution voluntarily.58
The Hong Kong government reformed this deficient environmental regulatory structure for two reasons. First, private law
actions, 59 such as nuisance and negligence, 60 were ineffective in resolving pollution control problems. 61 Second, policy makers in
Hong Kong were historically reluctant to allow any government
interference with business out of fear that such interference would
cause the undoing of Hong Kong's economic development. 62 Because no entity was going to clean up the pollution threatening
Hong Kong's economic growth, however, government regulation
became the best option to administer pollution control. 63
Policy makers are presently trying to set clearer environmental objectives. For instance, in the 1989 White Paper entitled
Pollution in Hong Kong-A Time to Act, the government envisioned its role as balancing economic development with environmental protection. 64 The document discussed avoiding new pollution problems from future development or redevelopment,
drafting legislation to provide effective control of existing pollution, and initiating the development of policies and programs appropriate for Hong Kong. 65 There have been three reviews of the
White Paper. The two most recent reviews in 1993 and 1995 called
for the incorporation of the concept of sustainable development
into Hong Kong policy in light of international recognition of this
58. See Robin Bidwell, Environmental Protection in Hong Kong: From Theory to
Practice,10 ENVTL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 247,248 (1990).
59. See Bryan Bachner, Common Law, Common Sense and the Environment in Hong
Kong, in LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA:

MARKET ECONOMY AND LAW 407, 421

(Wang Guiguo & Wei Zhenying eds., 1996). See generally BRYAN BACHNER, HONG
KONG TORT LAW (1996).
60. See Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (Eng.) (stating an
alternative rule for pollution control problems).
61. But see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LA(W AND ECONOMICS
89-94 (1983).
62. Nee HONG KONG HANSARD: REPORTS OF THE SITTINGS OF THE LEGISLTATIVE
COUNCIL OF HONG KONG, 1982183 Sess., Oct. 6, 1982-Aug. 10, 1983, at 863 (specch of
Stephen Cheong).
63. See Peter Hills, Environmental Protection in a Laissez-Faire Economy, in 11
BUILT ENV'T 268, 276-77 (1985); see also Sir David Wilson, Preface to ENVIRONMENT
HONG KONG 1989: A REVIEW OF 1988 (1989).
. 64. See ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION DEP'T, HONG KONG

RONMENT: HONG KONG 1989 (A REVIEW OF 1988), at 3 (1989).
65. See id.

GOV'T, ENVI-
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principle at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment
66
and Development.
ii. Target Standards
Target standards for pollution control are intended to define
environmental wrongdoing. In earlier legislation, as well as some
current forms, vague terms, such as nuisance, annoyance, dust, and
67
dark smoke, were used to identify environmental infringement.
The lack of definitional exactness made law enforcement unreliable.
Technological progress has, however, improved the legislative
drafters' exactness. The new terms of reference for target standards are known as the ambient quality standard (AQS). 68 The
AQS regulates the adverse effect that a pollutant may have on the
natural ecology. 69 It identifies the maximum quantity of pollution
tolerable in a particular area. In Hong Kong, these targets are
classified as water or air quality objectives.
iAlthough targets exist, legislation does not bind the government to strictly enforce these targets. The Hong Kong government has set up ten water70 and air 7 ' control zones. The Secretary
of Planning, Environment and Lands designates, in consultation
with the Advisory Council of the Environment, water 72 or air 73
quality objectives for each zone or different objectives for different
parts of the zones. The EPD is then responsible for achieving the
relative water 74 or air 75 quality objectives "as soon as is reasonably
' 76 practicable and thereafter maintaining the quality so achieved.
66. See ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1995, supra note 50, at 11; see also THE THIRD
REVIEW, supra note 38, at 8.
67. See, e.g., Clean Air Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. (1959); see also Edward Epstein, Air Pollution Control in Hong Kong: Where to Next?, 23 H.K. LJ. 448,449

(1993).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 37, at 35.
See iL
Water Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 358, § 4 (1980).
Air Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 311, § 6 (1987).
See Water Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 358, § 5.
See Air Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 311, § 7.
See Water Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 358, § 6.
See Air Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 311, § 8.
Water Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 358, § 6(3); see
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iii. Specification and Emission Standards
The AQS only provides a framework to assist in the achievement of environmental goals.. In Hong Kong, the actual legal
measure used to realize the AQS target is the license or permit
stipulating particular specification and emission standards.
Specification standards designate construction or technological conditions that, if complied with, should assure the achievement of acceptable environmental standards. A specification
standard focuses on the process by which the pollutant is generated and is less concerned with the emission itself. For example,
the -Air Pollution Control Ordinance (APCO) 77 will regulate
height of industrial chimneys or machinery used in certain industrial operations known as specified processes. 78 According to the
APCO, all specified processes are required to use "best practicable
means" (BPM)79 to prevent noxious or offensive emissions.80
[BPM], where used with respect to the emission from a premises of an air pollutant, has reference not only to the provision
and .the efficient maintenance of appliances adequate for preventing such emission, but also to the manner in which such
appliances are used and to the proper supervision by the owner
of the premises of any operation in which such an air pollutant
is evolved.81
The BPM test affords the government considerable discretion
in determining whether a polluter complies with the statutory requirements. For instance, an officer may consider the firm's present profitability and current economic condition. The primary
problem with the BPM test is that it does not oblige the EPD to
give a higher priority to environmental considerations. 82
also Air Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 311, § 8(2).
77. LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 311.
78. See id § 30.
79. See id § 12. See generally SIMON BALL & STUART BELL, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: THE LAW AND POLICY RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF-THE ENVIRONMENT

(3d ed., 1995).
80. For a critical review of the Air Pollution Control Ordinance, see Epstein, supra
note 67.
81. See Air Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 311, § 2.
82. See BALL & BELL, supra note 79, at 323-24. The United Kingdom currently uses
a standard for environmental decision-making known as "best available techniques not
entailing excessive costs." See id. According to this concept, every step should be taken
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In contrast, emission standards regulate the quantity and
quality of a particular pollutant after its discharge from an industrial operation. For example, the Water Pollution Control Ordinance (WPCO) specifies, through Technical Memoranda, 83 standards concerning the type and amount of pollutant that a polluter
may generate.84 The EPD may then grant a license on such terms
and conditions as the EPD thinks fit,85 but within the limitations
set out in the Technical Memoranda. 86 The EPD cannot secure
higher standards than those set out in the Technical Memoranda
unless there is good reason.87 The EPD is further restricted from
issuing licenses if the discharge would endanger the public health,
the health of a drainage or sewage worker, or the drainage or sew88
age system itself.
Under the WPCO, the EPD negotiates specific licenses with
each particular polluter, rather than applying a common universal
standard to all polluters. To implement this policy, the government is required to expend considerable human, technological,
and material resources. Such a non-standardized, highly flexible
approach to environmental decision-making may be preferable for
Hong Kong. A compelling argument in support of a flexible standard is that it provides a more equitable licensing procedure. The
impact of neighboring industry and transnational pollution makes
it difficult to calculate the quantity and quality of pollution generated by one particular industry. By designing standards applicable
to each firm, the government can assure greater certainty and fairness in the application of the law. Moreover, the EPD will induce
to protect the environment as long as relevant economic factors are taken into consideration. See id at 107-08. In addition, the United Kingdom utilizes the concept of the "best
practical environmental option" in environmental decision-making. This concept is a decision-making process that helps to determine whether a system is of most benefit or least
damage to the environment at an acceptable cost. See iL at 289.
83. See Water Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 358, § 21
(1980).

84. See id. § 20.
85. See id § 15(4).

86. See Technical Memorandum Standards for Effluents Discharged into Drainage
and Sewerage Systems, Inland and Coastal Waters, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 358 sub.
leg. AK, pt. 2.2 (1990).

87. See id
88. See Water Pollution Control Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 358, §

20(3)(a)-(c).
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•greater polluter compliance if the EPD is cooperative and the
polluter has willingly negotiated its own pollution control standards.
The establishment of strict environmental standards, on the
other hand, would be far too formalistic. It would either compel
polluters to conceal their infringements and induce less observance
of the law or, in the worst case scenario, would encourage polluting industries to transfer to neighboring countries where Hong
Kong must still deal .with the environmental harm of transboundary pollution but enjoy none of the economic benefits. Another
criticism of the formalization of standards is the generation of excessive administrative and financial costs for the government when
polluters litigate the enforcement of, or compliance with, environmental standards.,
The argument against formalization of environmental standards, however, may also be seen as flawed. First, if the EPD is
given absolute discretion to negotiate a license, no accountability
*exists to assure that the negotiated standard is at a socially desirable level. Second, because an agreed-upon license is legally
binding, it is equally possible that a polluter may feel as constrained by the license as the polluter would have been by the
statutory requirement due to changing industrial or commercial
circumstances. Third, the administrative costs for enforcing a universally formalized standard would be considerably less than the
costs for negotiating licenses with each particular polluter. In fact,
polluters should be more inclined to comply with a legal standard
than a license in order to avoid the transaction costs associated
with litigation.
The enactment of a new Environmental Impact Assessment
Ordinance (EIA Ordinance), however, should begin to redress the
difficulties associated with the enforcement of non-formalistic
standards for environmental protection. 89 In the past, the EPD
could not ensure compliance with environmental impact assessments (EIAs) because the EIAs were drafted under unenforceable
administrative requirements. The enactment of the EIA Ordinance should induce more compliance. First, under the EIA Or89. The Legislative Council was anticipated to vote on the EIA Bill sometime in late
1996. See Terri Mottershead, EnvironmentalImpact Assessment: Out with the Old and in
with the New?, ASIAN PAC. F. NEWSL., June 1996, at 6, 6-7.
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dinance, the EPD will have the authority to issue fines of up to
HK$5,000,000 for non-compliance. 90 Second, because developers
must follow statutory schedtiles for EIA reports, they will be
aware of environmental requirements at an earlier phase of developmental planning and therefore be in a better position to incorporate the necessary modifications. 91
b. Economic Instruments
Command and control environmental regulations require a
state authority to apply quasi-criminal law to achieve socially desired environmental goals. These regulations are designed to encourage firms to reduce pollution by imposing negative sanctions
upon polluters for unacceptable behavior. Criticisms concerning
administrative costs and overly intrusive policing activities have
caused law makers to contemplate alternative legal measures.
One such alternative is the use of economic instruments to achieve
pollution control objectives.
Two forms of eonomic instruments predominate the environmental debate in Hong Kong. The first form is a positive incentive, whereby the government provides a monetary inducement, such as a subsidy, for a firm to act in an acceptable manner.
The second form is a negative inducement, such as a charge or tax,
whereby the government imposes a monetary penalty upon a
wrongdoer to induce acceptable behavior. A third form is a tradeable emission right, 92 but so far, the Hong Kong government has
declined to use this form of economic instrument. 93
The principal argument in favor of using economic instruments for pollution control is that they are more cost-effective -and
simpler to administer than command and control measures. Although the use of the State's policing authority is still necessary to
90. See Technical Memorandum of Environmental Impact Assessment Bill; see also
The Proposed EIA Bill, H.K. ENVTL. L. ASS'N NEWSL. (Hong Kong Envtl. Law Ass'n,
Wanchai, H.K.), Spring 1996, at 13, 13.
91. See The Proposed EIA Bill, supra note 90, at 13.
92. See ENVIRONMENTAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 842 (William P. Cunningham et al. eds.,
1994).
93. See P.R. Holmes, Policies and Principlesin Hong Kong's Water PollutionControl
Legislation, 26 WATER SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY 1905, 1909 (1992); see also Ian Thynne,
The Right to Pollute as a Tradeable Commodity?, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN HONG
KONG105, 117 (Gary N. Heilbronn ed., 1993).
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implement economic instruments, the extent of State intervention
into commercial affairs is arguably less with economic instruments
than with command and control regulations. For instance, economic instruments are simple to enforce because polluters are only
required to meet specified targets, while command and control
regulations are complex and require expensive administrative and
informational costs for compliance. 94 Furthermore, the enforcement of command and control regulations necessitates proof of
criminal liability. Because criminal responsibility is so difficult to
prove, especially in the corporate setting, enforcement may become too expensive to litigate or may even be ignored. 95 Alternatively, the enforcement of economic instruments is simpler because
it requires only the imposition of economic charges when a polluter fails to meet socially acceptable environmental standards.
i. Subsidies
A pollution subsidy is intended to encourage the recipient to
reduce its own generation of pollution. In'economic terms, the
subsidy is justifiable if the value of the subsidy is equivalent to the
cost of the pollution damage averted. It is difficult, however, to
determine whether its application is cost-effective due to uncertainties underlying the calculation of the cost of pollution damage.96 Another drawback of the subsidy is that, unlike charges or
taxes, it requires a withdrawal from the public treasury.
The most prodigious subsidy mandated by the government
has been the HK$20 billion used to capitalize construction for the
Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme and the collection systems under the Sewerage Master Plans. 97 Additionally, the government
provides a number of services to assist firms in pollution control
methods. For instance, the EPD publishes a number of handbooks
to assist Compliance with environmental regulations, such as A
Guide to the Control on Import and Export of Waste and Grease
Traps for Restaurants and Food Processors. Furthermore, the
94. See OGUS, supra note 39, at 245.
95. See RICHARDSON ET AL., supranote 37, at 14-16.
96. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
97. See Edward S. Chu, Letter to the Editor, Community Must Face Up to Responsibilities, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 7, 1996, at 16; Emily Thornton, Affluence and
Effluents, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 14,1996, at 57.
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EPD, the Drainage Authority, the Industry Department, 99 and the
Hong Kong Productivity Council, which is a government subvented organization, offer individual consultation on pollution
control matters. Finally, the government has an extensive conservation program for country parks 99 and marine parks. 100
ii. Charges and Taxes
The government imposes a charge or tax on a polluter if the
polluter *fails to meet a statutorily or contractually agreed-upon
environmental standard. 101 The charge or tax is intended to induce the polluter not to pollute by charging the polluter for the
cost of cleaning up the pollution. The charge or tax results in the
efficient allocation of resources when the polluter pays the costs to
clean up its self-generated pollution.
Charges are often calculated on the basis of the quantity and
quality, of the discharge. The valuation of the charge is complicated because the costs of environmental damage are difficult to
assess. Nevertheless, charges offer a double advantage: they serve
as a negative inducement for polluters to reduce pollution, and
they generate funds to support other pollution control activities.
In 1993, for example, Hong Kong formulated a charging scheme to
administer its sewage and waste problems. 102 The charging
scheme for domestic waste is scaled to the amount of water that
the polluter uses. 103 According to the charging strategy principle,
the more water that the consumer uses, the more waste the consumer must be generating. 104 In addition to the. basic charges, the
government has established a trade effluent charge for certain con98. The Hong Kong government's Industry Department has also published a guidebook to assist industries in complying with pollution control legislation. See INDUSTRY
DEP'T, HONG KONG GOV'T, A GUIDE TO POLLUTION CONTROL LEGISLATION AFFECTING MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 1994 (1994).
99. See Country Parks Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 208 (1986).
100. See Marine Parks Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 476 (1995); Environment
and Conservation Fund Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 450 (1994); see also Fiona
Holland, Vessels Plunder Marine Reserve, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 1, 1996, at 4.
101. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 713 (1932).
102. See HONG KONG GOV'T, SEWAGE CHARGING SCHEME: AN INTRODUCTION
(1993) (on file with the author) [hereinafter SEWAGE CHARGING SCHEME].
103. See id. at 1, annex; see also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DEP'T, HONG KONG
GOV'T, ENVIRONMENT: HONG KONG 1996: (A REVIEW OF 1995), at 85 (1996).
104. See SEWAGE CHARGING SCHEME, supra note 102, at 1, annex.
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sumers to account for the exorbitant costs of cleaning up industrial
and commercial discharges. 10 5 The government maintains trade
effluent charges in a trading fund, which is solely designed to sup106
port pollution control activities.
Furthermore, the government uses a charging scheme to support the operation of a chemical waste treatment plant and landfills. 107 For the first two years, the government subsidized the use
of the chemical waste treatment plant, thus allowing manufacturers to use the plant for free.108 In 1995, however, the government
reduced its subsidies and began to reclaim the operation costs of
the waste treatment plan through charges. 10 9 A private company
operates the plant under license to the government. Although reports indicate that charges will recover only twenty percent of the
plant's operation costs in the first year, the plant is expected to be
self-financing by 2003.110 Similarly, the government uses a charging scheme to administer the operation of its landfill sites.111,
In sum, the environmental regulatory structure of Hong Kong
has achieved a promising level of development. 1 2 Although the
government still adopts a flexible approach toward pollution control and grants the EPD a considerable degree of discretion to enforce environmental staftdards, environmental enforcement records show that prosecutions for pollution control infractions are
increasing and environmental quality may be improving. 113 The
enactment of the EIA Ordinance should provide a clear and comprehensive approach to pollution control enforcement and further
enhance the situation.

105. See id.
106. See id. at 2-3.
107. See K.M. Li & Michael K. Pang, User Charges: An Incentive for Waste Minimisation, in ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1995, supra note 50, at 54,54-55.
108. See id. at 55.
109. See id at 55.
110. See id. at 55.
111. See id. at 54-55.
112. See Julie Bloch, Conservationin a Concrete Jungle: Political Legal and Societal
Obstacles to EnvironmentalProtection in Hong Kong, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 593,
619 (1994).
113. See ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1995, supra note 50, at 204-12.
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III. REFORM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Part II of this Article argued that Hong Kong, under British
rule, does not apply the laissez-faire style of governance, particularly with regard to environmental protection, that many claim it
does. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong will convert from the United
Kingdom's political possession to a Special Administrative Region
of the PRC. The debate concerning the State's future role in Hong
Kong's economic affairs will be particularly relevant to Hong
Kong's environmental policy. To understand the impact of Hong
Kong's transition to Chinese rule on domestic environmental protection law, it will be useful to examine the modem development
of economic and institutional reform in the PRC.
Since 1978, the PRC has implemented comprehensive economic reform, and to a lesser extent, political reform. The economic reform is designed to convert a highly centralized, planned
economy into a market-oriented, socialist economy with unique
Chinese characteristics. Implicit in the Chinese idea of reform is
the notion that the market is a better allocator of resources than
the State. Nevertheless, implementation of the reform is not used
to justify the State's absolute withdrawal from economic matters.
The reality is that policy makers are still trying to come to terms
with the appropriate level of government intervention in the marketplace. The State has recognized that independent, competitive
firms are better equipped than state-owned enterprises to distribute and manufacture most products. The State has therefore begun to divest itself of the responsibility of controlling the economy,
as well as to limit its commercial activity to enterprises necessary
for state security.114 While it would be overzealous to claim that
the State has repositioned itself as a defende? of the welfare system against the failures of the free market; it is fair to suggest that
the State's intention in the PRC is to correct the failures of a market-oriented, socialist economy. This intention is illustrated
through the enactment of encyclopaedic welfare legislation.
The bellwether for market reform and the end of Maoist centralized economic planning appears to be a Communique that the.
Chinese Communist Party Congress issued on December 23,

114. See generally Alison W. Conner, To Get Rich is Precarious: Regulation of Private
Enterprisein the People'sRepublic of China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 1 (1991).
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1978.115 The Communique articulates reasons for adopting economic and legal reform.1 16 It stated that one of the weaknesses of
centralized planning was the centralization of too much power at
the top of the hierarchy. 117 The need to decentralize power was
emphasized so that local authorities, as well as agricultural and industrial enterprises, would have greater autonomy to make their
own decisions." 8 The Communique highlighted the need to improve productivity through increased respect for economic law and
integration of political and ideological work with economic
work. n 9 The Communique also advocated the separation of party
and government from the operation of enterprise. 120 Finally, the
Communique displayed a new institutional attitude, whereby the
State's position as a leading economic planner would be initially
restrained and then succeeded by market forces. 121
The National People's Congress formalized this institutional
attitude on March 29, 1993 by amending article 15 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. 122 Originally, article 15
stipulated the implementation of a planned economy on the basis
of socialist public ownership. 123 Central planners were to assure
the proportionate and coordinated growth of the national economy by balancing economic planning and regulation. 124 Article 15
forbade organizations and individuals from disturbing or disrupting the State's econormic plan in any way. 125 These stipulations
were replaced with the following amendments: "The state practices socialist market economy. The state strengthens economic

115. See Communique of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the 11th
Communist Party Congress (Dec. 23, 1978).
116. See id
117. See id.
118:"See id
119. See id

120. See id
121. See id

122. See Announcement of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of
China No. 8, Amendment to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 8th National People's Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 29, 1993), in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S RE-

PUBLIC OF CHINA 1993, at 3 (1993).
123. See id.
at 6.
124. See id
125. See id
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legislation, improves macro-regulation and control, and prohibits
in accordance with the law any organization or individual from disturbing the socio-economic order." 126 The amended constitution
affirms the reduction of State involvement in the country's economic affairs. The exclusion in the amendment of any mention of
planning indicates the nature of the reform.
Research on Chinese law and policy also demonstrates that
the central question for academics and policy makers is the extent
to which the State ought be involved in economic matters.
Shaoguang Wang argues that the debate in China concerning the
State's role has just started. 127 Fifteen years ago, economic debate
focused on whether the market should be used as a planning tool.
One would be hard pressed today, however, to find the word
"planning" in any economic journal. Fifteen years ago, Marxist
terminology marked the economic debate, but today, the debate
turns on concepts such as property rights, efficient allocation, and
market failures.
Other scholars focus on the evolution of the institutionalization of the law-making process, emphasizing that the role of certain state authorities continues to develop. Stanley Lubman
stresses that China's present accomplishments in institution building are merely a first step in a long journey. 128 James Feinerman
shows that, while China is committed to implementing market and
legal reform, the extent to which the State will govern economic
and political matters remains unsettled. 129 Murray Tanner argues
that the National People's Congress has plans to challenge the
authority of the State Council in areas such as interagency review
and the drafting of implementing regulations. 130 Susan Finder asserts that the Supreme Court of the People's Republic of China
has a greater role in making and enforcing legal rules, as well as
achieving an unusually prominent status for a court in a civil law
126. See id.
127. See Shaoguang Wang, Learning by Debating: The Changing Role of the State in
China'sEconomy and Economic Theories,23 POL'Y STUD. J. 11, 21 (1995).
128. See Stanley Lubman, Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law, 1995 CHINA Q. 1,
19.
129. See James Feinerman, Economic and Legal Reform in China, 1978-91, PROBS.
COMMUNISM, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 62,74-75.

130. See Murray Scot Tanner, How a Bill Becomes a Law in China: Stages and Processes in Lawmaking, 1995 CHINA Q. 39,64.

386.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 19:363

jurisdiction. 131
132
Even commentary regarding environmental law and policy
highlights policy makers' struggles to determine the State's role in
controlling excess pollution133 -the unpleasant by-product of the
PRC's rapid economic growth. 134 The Chinese government has
published a state policy report affirming the necessity of adopting
sustainable development principles when the environmental
authorities implement pollution control policy. 135 Lester Ross
points out that the extent of the State's involvement in environmental policy will depend upon such variables as economic efficiency and price irrationality, transboundary pollution, urban and
rural conflicts, population pressures and resource scarcity, and future development projects. 136 Vincent Yang argues that the PRC
should not use criminal law enforcement measures to implement
environmental regulations. Instead, he suggests that the State
137
should rely on traditional means of social control.
IV. CONCLUSION: HONG KONd's ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

1997
In the events leading to July 1, 1997, the PRC has endeavored
to assure as smooth a transition as possible. Specifically, with regard to environmental protection, the tone of environmental diplomacy between Hong Kong and the PRC appears to have been
cooperative. For example, the Basic Law provides nominal menAFTER JULY 1,

131. See Susan Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China,
7 J. CHINESE L. 145,223 (1993).
132. See LESTER Ross & MITCHELL A. SILK, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1987).

133. See Bryan Bachner, Coming Home to Roost: Pollution, Law and Economics in
the People's Republic of China 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 635 (1993); see also Bryan
Bachner, Regulating Pollution in the People's Republic of China:An Analysis of the Enforcement of Environmental Law, 7 COLO. -J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 373 (1996)
[hereinafter Bachner, Regulating Pollutionin the PRC].
134. See Tom Korski, FactoriesClosed as Environmental Agency Targets Polluters, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 1,1996, at 8.
135. See CHINA'S AGENDA 21-WHITE PAPER ON CHINA'S POPULATION, ENVIRONMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21T CENTURY 14 (1994).

136. See Lester Ross, The Politics of Environmental Policy in the People's Republic of
China,20 POL'Y STUD. J. 628, 633-35 (1992).
137. See Vinicent Cheng Yang, Punishingfor EnvironmentalProtection?-Enforcement
Issues in China,44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 671, 682 (1995).
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tion of environmental protection by stipulating that the HKSAR
government shall "pay regard to the protection of the environment. ' 138 Also, Hong Kong and Guangdong Province have established the Hong Kong Guangdong Environmental Liaison Group
and a technical sub-group to provide a focus for formal interaction
between environmental authorities in the region. Other institutional cooperation includes visits to Hong Kong in October 1994
by the Director of the Guangdong Environmental Protection Bu139
reau and the Shenzhen Environmental Protection Bureau.
The progress has not, however, always been so nonconfrontational. Recently, Beijing authorities asked the Hong
Kong government to reconsider the cost and environmental impact of Hong Kong's multi-billion dollar sewage control scheme.
Chinese authorities claimed that the plan was environmentally unsound, 140 economically corrupt, 141 and immoral. 142 The PRC,
however, subsequently limited its criticism of the first phase of the
project, which will not affect Chinese territory. Because the second phase of the project would in part discharge waste in Chinese
seas and potentially affect Chinese territory, the development of
the second phase is under some form of regional discussion. Additionally, Hong Kong enterprises have been involved in highprofile environmental infringement cases in southern PRC. These
cases have all been adjudicated and resolved, however, within the
Chinese court system. 143
Although the potential for short term institutional cooperation between Hong Kong and mainland PRC appears relatively
manageable, the differing ideological tendencies between them
raise serious concerns about Hong Kong's environmental viability

138. See Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China art. 119 (1990), reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1519, 1538 (1990).
139. See ENVIRONMENT HONG KONG 1995, supranote 50,at 98.
140. See Shiny Li, Beijing Condemns Sewage Proposals,E. EXPRESS, Oct. 10, 1994; see
also Patricia Young, Beijing to Reject Sewage Scheme, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 15,.
1994, at 6; Wing Kay Po, Last Ditch Warning on Sewerage, E. EXPRESS, Jan. 27, 1995.
141. See Rain Ren, MainlandChief Slams Governmentfor Putting ProfitBefore LongTerm Interests as Talks on Scheme Loom, E. EXPRESS, Jan. 28-29, 1995.
142. See Beijing Says Sewage Scheme Is Immoral, H.K. STANDARD, Mar. 1, 1995.
143. See Mitchell A. Silk & Lester Ross, Environmental Planningfor Investment Projects in China, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 11-27 to 11-33 (W. Streng & A. Wilcox eds.,
Release 5, 1996) (discussing the Kaida Enterprises,Ltd case).
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in the medium and long term. The paradox underlying the July 1,
1997 transition is that, while Hong Kong is converting from a laissez-faire economy to a more highly regulated one, China's reform
tends toward deregulation. It is a further paradox that China often
justifies its model of decentralization and marketization on the
successful Hong Kong model when a rational analysis of the Hong
Kong situation is much more complex. 1 " The impact of this position on Hong Kong's future environmental policy could become
quite problematic.
Over the last fifteen years, Hong Kong policy makers have
come a long way toward correcting the State's non-involvement in
pollution control matters. A competent institutional establishment
presently supports a comprehensive regulatory framework. The
practice of accounting for environmental protection and economic
development, otherwise known as sustainable development, 145 in
the application of anti-pollution regulation, while not a formal part
of the environmenial decision-making process, is becoming increasingly more relevant to legal discourse.
Due to Hong Kong's diminutive geographic vicinity, dense
industrial development, and highly populated area, it is critical
that the implementation of environmental policy aspire to the
achievement of sustainable development. In the process, the policy must account for the historical, practical, and unique characteristics of Hong Kong's present environmental framework. The new
government must get this balance right. The imposition of extreme or unsound regulatory practice by a new governance structure could sabotage Hong Kong's prosperous economic growth
policy, derail its emerging environmental regulatory system, and
cause irreparable harm to its deteriorating ecological heritage.

144. See Bachner, Regulating Pollution in the PRC,supra note 133, at 407-08.
145. See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 433 (1992).

